Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control and Its Mitigations by Addy, Harold E., Jr. et al.
Andrew L. Reehorst, Harold E. Addy, Jr., and Renato O. Colantonio
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control
and Its Mitigations
NASA/TM—2010-216912
November 2010
AIAA–2010–8140
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100042407 2019-08-30T13:54:46+00:00Z
NASA STI Program . . . in Profi le
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA Scientifi c and Technical Information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role.
The NASA STI Program operates under the auspices 
of the Agency Chief Information Offi cer. It collects, 
organizes, provides for archiving, and disseminates 
NASA’s STI. The NASA STI program provides access 
to the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database and 
its public interface, the NASA Technical Reports 
Server, thus providing one of the largest collections 
of aeronautical and space science STI in the world. 
Results are published in both non-NASA channels 
and by NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which 
includes the following report types:
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major signifi cant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
programs and include extensive data or theoretical 
analysis. Includes compilations of signifi cant 
scientifi c and technical data and information 
deemed to be of continuing reference value. 
NASA counterpart of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent of 
graphic presentations.
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientifi c 
and technical fi ndings that are preliminary or 
of specialized interest, e.g., quick release 
reports, working papers, and bibliographies that 
contain minimal annotation. Does not contain 
extensive analysis.
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientifi c and 
technical fi ndings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees.
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientifi c and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or cosponsored by NASA.
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientifi c, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having substantial 
public interest.
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientifi c and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.
Specialized services also include creating custom 
thesauri, building customized databases, organizing 
and publishing research results.
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI program home page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov
 
• E-mail your question via the Internet to help@
sti.nasa.gov
 
• Fax your question to the NASA STI Help Desk 
at 443–757–5803
 
• Telephone the NASA STI Help Desk at
 443–757–5802
 
• Write to:
           NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI)
           7115 Standard Drive
           Hanover, MD 21076–1320
Andrew L. Reehorst, Harold E. Addy, Jr., and Renato O. Colantonio
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control
and Its Mitigations
NASA/TM—2010-216912
November 2010
AIAA–2010–8140
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Glenn Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Prepared for the
Atmospheric and Space Environments Conference
sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 2–5, 2010
Available from
NASA Center for Aerospace Information
7115 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076–1320
National Technical Information Service
5301 Shawnee Road
Alexandria, VA 22312
Available electronically at http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov
Level of Review: This material has been technically reviewed by technical management. 
NASA/TM—2010-216912 1 
Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control and Its Mitigations 
 
Andrew L. Reehorst, Harold E. Addy, Jr., and Renato O. Colantonio 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Glenn Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
Abstract 
Factors external to the aircraft are often a significant causal factor in loss of control (LOC) accidents. 
In today’s aviation world, very few accidents stem from a single cause and typically have a number of 
causal factors that culminate in a LOC accident. Very often the “trigger” that initiates an accident 
sequence is an external environment factor. In a recent NASA statistical analysis of LOC accidents, 
aircraft icing was shown to be the most common external environmental LOC causal factor for scheduled 
operations. When investigating LOC accident or incidents aircraft icing causal factors can be categorized 
into groups of 1) in-flight encounter with super-cooled liquid water clouds, 2) take-off with ice 
contamination, or 3) in-flight encounter with high concentrations of ice crystals. As with other flight 
hazards, icing induced LOC accidents can be prevented through avoidance, detection, and recovery 
mitigations. For icing hazards, avoidance can take the form of avoiding flight into icing conditions or 
avoiding the hazard of icing by making the aircraft tolerant to icing conditions. Icing detection mitigations 
can take the form of detecting icing conditions or detecting early performance degradation caused by 
icing. Recovery from icing induced LOC requires flight crew or automated systems capable of accounting 
for reduced aircraft performance and degraded control authority during the recovery maneuvers. In this 
report we review the icing induced LOC accident mitigations defined in a recent LOC study and for each 
mitigation describe a research topic required to enable or strengthen the mitigation. Many of these 
research topics are already included in ongoing or planned NASA icing research activities or are being 
addressed by members of the icing research community. These research activities are described and the 
status of the ongoing or planned research to address the technology needs is discussed.  
Introduction 
Loss of Control Study 
In July of 2009, Dr. Amy Pritchett, the NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) Program Director, 
initiated a study of the fundamental research required to address aircraft loss of control. The study team 
was chartered to “identify and prioritize the most important research activities needed to address the loss 
of control problem, considering research relevant to helping avoid loss of control situations in the first 
place, detect them if they should occur, and then safely recover from them (automatically or manually)” 
(Pritchett). The team was further directed to examine LOC from both a short-term and long-term 
perspective, identifying research activities that could have rapid impact as well as those that address the 
evolving nature of aviation, such as NextGen airspace concepts and emerging advanced flight 
technologies. 
A team of seven members from four NASA research centers interviewed subject matter experts and 
reviewed loss of control accident reports, previous LOC studies, and statistical analyses. Based upon 
these investigations and experience in the related research topic areas, the team then developed a list of 
key mitigations and related research topics, and published a findings and recommendations document 
(Jacobson). 
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Aircraft Icing as a Loss of Control Trigger 
“Loss of control includes significant, unintended departure of the aircraft from controlled flight, the 
operational flight envelope, or usual flight attitudes, including ground events” (Jacobson). Factors 
external to the aircraft are often a significant causal factor in loss of control accidents. In today’s aviation 
world, very few accidents have a single cause, but rather a number of causal factors must be lined up to 
cause a loss of control accident. Very often the “trigger” that initiates an accident sequence is an external 
environmental factor.  
Arguably, the most significant environmental hazard for triggering LOC accidents is icing. Based 
upon a review of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
and NASA database information (Reveley), icing was a causal factor in 54 percent of Part 121 and 
scheduled Part 135 LOC accidents (out of a total of 40), 27 percent of unscheduled Part 135 LOC 
accidents (out of a total of 159), and 6 percent of Part 91 LOC accidents (out of a total of 4287) Note: Our 
definition of icing as a causal factor includes the “WX – Icing”, “Inadequate Ice/Frost Removal”, and a 
portion of “WX - Snow/Rain” Causal Factors from the Reveley report. 
By its very nature, icing can induce a LOC accident by way of many paths. For example: a severe ice 
accretion can cause such drastic aerodynamic degradation that the aircraft becomes uncontrollable; icing 
can cause a drag increase such that an inattentive flight crew lets the speed degrade to wing stall; or an ice 
accretion can limit control effectiveness so that in an emergency maneuver the aircraft becomes 
uncontrollable. While all of these accident scenarios would play out very differently, they can all be 
described as being triggered by the aircraft’s initial encounter with atmospheric icing conditions.  
Just as the icing environmental trigger can cause different accident scenarios, the resultant loss of 
control accident could be prevented through several potential mitigations. The icing environment can 
ideally be completely avoided. Since avoidance results in the lowest potential for harm to the aircraft its 
crew and passengers, it is the preferred option. However, avoidance is often impractical and rarely 
100 percent effective, with inadvertent exposure always a possibility, so reliance on either ice protection 
(avoidance of the icing hazard by designing in robustness) or early detection and exit are the next best 
strategies. If both the avoidance and detection options are missed, the final possible mitigation to prevent 
a loss of control accident is recovery. Since the level of risk increases as a potential accident scenario 
plays out and the number of potential mitigations correspondingly decreases, the earlier a loss of control 
causal factor is mitigated, the better. Therefore, the avoidance mitigations are almost always preferred 
over detection and recovery. Accordingly, research to enable avoidance mitigations (avoiding the icing 
conditions completely or avoiding the icing hazard through ice protection technologies) should in general 
be favored over those of detection and recovery where other factors are equal. Similarly, detection 
mitigation related research should be favored over that required for recovery mitigations. Other factors to 
be considered in prioritizing research include such things as probability of success, expected time to 
implementation, and cost and likelihood of implementation. 
For the text that follows, the avoidance, detection, and recovery mitigations will be further refined to 
explain exactly what is being avoided, detected, or recovered from. For example, when icing causes a loss 
of airspeed leading to loss of control we can avoid the icing conditions altogether or we can make the 
aircraft tolerant of ice (with an appropriate ice protection system). Both mitigations avoid the hazard, but 
are very different from one another. Similarly, we can detect the ice accretion or we can detect the 
resulting low airspeed condition.  
Icing Causal Factors 
The loss of control causal factor of icing is actually made up of several different hazards that lead to 
accidents:  
 
1. Inflight ice accretion that causes aircraft performance degradation and a subsequent LOC. 
Icing build up on an aircraft will lead to increased drag, which slows the vehicle or requires an 
increase in thrust to maintain speed. Additionally, ice accretion on wing surfaces leads to an 
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increase in the stall speed and a reduction in stall angle-of-attack. The combination of these 
factors can lead to an unintentional stall upset. 
2. Attempted takeoff with snow and ice that built up while the aircraft was on the ground that 
prevents the aircraft from achieving sufficient flight speeds. During ground operations snow 
and ice can accumulate on aircraft surfaces quickly resulting in an unsafe condition for takeoff. 
Ground ice contamination may occur after the airplane has already been de-iced and the crew is 
confident that their vehicle is flight worthy. Ground ice contamination is fundamentally different 
than that accreted inflight. The contamination can be located anywhere on the airframe and may 
or may not be actually adhering to the surface. 
3. Ice accretions cause flight control difficulties due to degraded aerodynamics over the flight 
control surfaces. Surfaces may lose control effectiveness or have nonlinear dynamics 
characteristics leading to a vehicle that is difficult or impossible to manually control. 
4. Engine ingestion of shed ice, ingestion of high levels of ice crystals, or carburetor icing can 
cause power loss and asymmetric thrust leading to LOC. There are many examples in the 
accident databases that describe loss of control events following propulsion system failure. While 
often not directly causing loss of control, propulsion system failure is often the “trigger” event. 
The actual loss of control can be caused by asymmetric thrust, insufficient airspeed, flight crew 
distraction, or several other causal factors. 
5. Either inflight or ground icing can cause complete airdata system failure when the pitot or 
static pressure ports become blocked. A number of recent accidents may be attributed to false 
airspeed and altitude measurements due to blockage of the air data ports. 
 
Some form of icing causes each of these hazards, but each hazard is unique and generally requires a 
different form of mitigation. Historically icing has been considered primarily an inflight aircraft 
performance issue. However, a review of the accident databases reveals that all forms of the icing hazard 
occur with alarming frequency. Table 1 provides accident references for each of these icing hazard 
categories.  
 
TABLE 1.—CATEGORIES OF ICING FLIGHT HAZARDS AND 
EXAMPLE ACCIDENT INFORMATION 
Category of icing Accident identification information 
Site Aircraft Year 
Inflight icing induced airspeed 
loss below stall speed 
Buffalo, NY DHC-8 2009 
Santa Maria, CA Saab 340 2006 
Pueblo, CO Cessna 560 2005 
Moscow, Russia Cessna 206 2005 
West Palm, FL EMB-120 2001 
Monroe, MI EMB-120 1997 
Takeoff with snow and ice 
contamination 
Montrose, CO CL-600 2004 
Baotou, China CRJ-200 2004 
Flushing, NY F-28 1992 
Cleveland, OH DC-9 1991 
Denver, CO DC-9 1987 
Flight control difficulties caused 
by ice contamination induced 
aerodynamic disruption 
Roselawn, IN ATR-72 1994 
Beckley, WV Jetstream 31 1991 
Stockholm, Sweden Vickers Viscount 1977 
Propulsion system degradation 
caused by engine ingestion of 
shed ice, ingestion of high levels 
of ice crystals, or carburetor 
icing 
Wichita Falls, TX Champion 2008 
Ft. Yukon, AK Cessna 550 2005 
Machiques, Venezuela MD-82 2005 
Sarasota, FL Beechjet 400 2004 
Gottora, Sweden MD-81 1991 
Air data system failure caused by 
ice blockage 
Kagoshima, Japan A330 2009 
Wellsville, MO PA-46 2007 
Union Star, MO B-717 2005 
Flushing, NY MD-82 1994 
Washington, DC B-737 1982 
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Mitigating the Aircraft Icing Hazard 
To some degree, each of these icing hazards can be mitigated through avoidance, detection, and 
recovery. Some mitigations, such as the avoidance of icing conditions through the use of improved 
weather information, can be applicable to all forms of icing hazard. While other mitigations, such as the 
detection of air data system ice blockage, are very specific to a particular icing hazard. Table 2 provides a 
detailed listing of the icing hazards, mitigations, and associated research topics developed during the 
NASA LOC Study. In general the mitigations can be broken down into the following areas: 
 
1. Avoidance of icing conditions (inflight supercooled liquid or ice crystals, or ground level freezing 
or frozen precipitation) or icing-conducive weather through the use of improved weather 
information. The improved weather knowledge can be a result of improved icing nowcast and 
forecast products or the use of remote airborne or ground-based icing weather sensors.  
2. Avoidance of icing conditions with enhanced training. Whether it be for the flightcrew, airline 
dispatchers, or air traffic controllers, enhanced knowledge of the icing environment, its impact to 
aircraft, and methods for avoidance would help mitigate the risk of icing accidents by allowing 
better go/no-go and routing decisions. 
3. Avoidance of icing induced performance and controllability degradation by making aircraft more 
icing tolerant. Through their design and equipage, modern commercial aircraft can today safely 
operate in a wide range of known icing conditions. Through the use of improved empirical and 
computational design methods and advanced ice protections technologies, existing aircraft types 
can be manufactured to be tolerant of greater levels of icing severity, and new, emerging aircraft 
technologies can be engineered to be ice tolerant earlier in the design process. The flight control 
system can be designed to be more tolerant of ice contamination and be capable of adapting itself 
to changing control authority and envelope limits. Also, the design standards can be improved as 
we gain a better understanding of the range of icing conditions that can be encountered. As global 
route coverage expands and the volume of traffic increases rare and geographically specific icing 
conditions must be accounted for to maximize fleet safety. 
4. Detection of ice build-up with sensor systems. The various forms of icing hazard require different 
forms of instrumentation due to the nature of their ice accretion (inflight icing primarily needs 
very sensitive detection with leading edge coverage, ground icing requires detection with entire 
airframe coverage, engine icing requires detection in very small, possibly rotating locations, and 
airdata icing detection requires quick detection of port or line blockage). All forms of detection 
must also be annunciated to the flightcrew in an unambiguous manner that does not cause 
unnecessary workload. If icing is detected by one aircraft, that information can be shared with the 
airspace system to allow avoidance by others. 
5. Detection of abnormal flight conditions (current or impending low energy or reduced control 
effectiveness). While this is not an icing-specific mitigation, it is included here for completeness. 
Either through automated sensor systems, or enhanced pilot training, the detection of abnormal 
low speed, deceleration, or control authority caused by icing is a powerful mitigation to avoid 
icing related accidents. Many accidents are in part the result of the flightcrews’ lack of awareness 
of the state of their aircraft. This information could allow flightcrews or automated systems to 
properly adapt to the actual (not ideal) condition of their aircraft. 
6. Recovery from icing induced upsets. By using either automated systems or enhanced pilot 
training, most icing related accidents could be avoided if the proper recovery maneuver/technique 
were utilized. This is technically difficult since it requires properly recognizing the complete state 
of the aircraft (upset cause, aircraft configuration, aircraft energy, propulsion capability, and 
existing control authority) and then properly executing the appropriate recovery 
maneuver/technique. For manual recovery, this may also require additional pilot training, which 
in turn may require high fidelity post-stall flight simulation. 
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NASA Aircraft Icing Research 
For more than 30 years, NASA has conducted and sponsored fundamental and applied research 
related to aircraft icing. The research addresses icing causes, effects, and mitigations. Historically, NASA 
has expended its greatest research efforts in the development of ice accretion simulation computer 
programs. The LEWICE codes (2–D and 3–D versions are available) are widely recognized as the 
standard for the modeling of inflight ice accretion on aircraft surfaces. Part of what has made these codes 
so widely used and recognized is that NASA has spent a great deal of effort validating the codes through 
experimental testing. NASA is also widely known for its ground icing facility, the Icing Research Tunnel 
(IRT). The IRT was originally built to answer icing questions that arose during World War II, but over the 
last 25 years has been continuously updated with new heat exchanger, fan drive, control, and data 
acquisition systems and is the busiest wind tunnel within NASA.  
Building upon the strengths of its ice accretion modeling and ground testing capability, NASA has 
developed a broad portfolio of icing related research activities that address icing causes, effects, and 
mitigations. Using the LOC vocabulary, NASA Icing Research has elements addressing the avoidance, 
detection, and recovery from inflight icing hazards for many of the possible forms of icing hazard 
including inflight encounter with super-cooled cloud, with super-cooled larger droplet (SLD) conditions, 
and with high ice-water-content conditions, and is addressing the resultant aircraft loss of performance, 
loss of controllability and stability, loss of thrust, and loss of airdata systems. We will maintain the focus 
on avoidance, detection, and recovery mitigations by using these major elements.  
NASA Icing Avoidance Research Elements 
1. Avoidance of icing conditions with the use of improved weather information. By providing 
accurate and timely icing weather to the flight crew and other members of the aviation community 
(such as dispatch, air traffic control, and airport operations), icing condition encounters can be 
completely avoided. The two primary means of proving improved icing weather information is to 
develop new weather product and new sensor systems. 
a. Weather product development. The current state-of-the-art FAA-approved inflight icing 
weather products were developed outside of NASA, but with NASA support through 
collaborative flight test activities. Most recently, NASA flight test efforts focused on SLD 
produced excellent collaborative opportunities with the weather product developers. The flight 
test crews at NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) and the modeling experts at the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) collaborated so that NCAR gained in-situ validation 
data while the flight crews received real-time weather guidance to help locate the most intense 
weather conditions. Over the past several years NASA has also expanded its role by leveraging 
earth observing satellite expertise towards aviation needs, including inflight icing detection. The 
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Science Directorate is refining satellite visible and IR 
data channel analysis to produce high-resolution imagery-based icing products. When fully 
developed and validated, these weather products will provide much better guidance for the 
aviation community to strategically avoid areas of icing hazard while still in the flight planning 
phase. Currently planned flight campaigns into cruise-altitude high-concentration ice crystal 
environments will serve to provide the first systematic characterization effort of this potential 
flight hazard. Part of the flight campaign science plan objectives is to provide data for the future 
development of forecast products. 
b. Remote sensor system development. Over the past several years, NASA GRC has developed a 
ground-based remote sensing technology for detecting and measuring the icing environment aloft. 
By combining microwave radiometers, weather radar, and lidar ceilometers, the NASA Icing 
Remote Sensing System (NIRSS) is able to produce vertical profiles of icing hazards directly 
above the ground instrumentation site that has been demonstrated to compare well with aircraft-
based measurements. Leveraging Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program funding, 
icing remote sensing technology is being extended into volume ground scanning and airborne, 
NASA/TM—2010-216912 8 
forward-looking systems. While the improved weather products described above will allow icing 
avoidance in the planning phase, these remote sensing instrument systems will provide flight 
crews the needed information for tactical rerouting during flights. As with the weather product 
development element, the planned flight campaigns into cruise-altitude high-concentration ice 
crystal environments will also contain a remote sensing research effort to provide guidance for 
the remote identification of this flight hazard. 
2. Avoiding icing conditions with enhanced training. In the past, NASA produced a series of pilot 
training products that have been widely praised and utilized. These training products were developed 
using NASA’s unique mix of multimedia development, behavioral research, and icing research skills 
and expertise at NASA GRC, LaRC, and Ames Research Center (ARC). NASA is currently pursuing 
a new level of cooperative training product development with the FAA targeting Designated 
Engineering Representative (DER) personnel, airline dispatchers, and other members of the aviation 
community that have not received targeted icing training in the past. This form of training will 
strengthen the decision making process related to icing hazard reduction during aircraft certification 
and flight planning. 
3. Avoidance of icing triggered LOC by making aircraft icing tolerant with advanced design tools. 
By providing aircraft designers with improved design tools, aircraft can be manufactured that have 
greater tolerance for flight into icing conditions. The needed tools include improved ice accretion 
simulation for airframes and engines, improved modeling of the impact of these ice accretions on the 
performance and operation of aircraft and its engines, and the modeling of the impact of ice accretion 
on the control of aircraft. The development of these tools would allow the mitigation of avoiding 
icing hazards (that would otherwise lead to LOC situations) at the aircraft design phase. 
a. Ice accretion simulation tools (airframe and engine). Historically, this has been the heart of the 
NASA GRC icing research program. The LEWICE family of programs (2–D and 3–D) is the 
internationally recognized standard for computational ice accretion simulation. These programs 
are used by aircraft and component designers to define the requirements for aircraft ice protection 
systems. 
b. Iced aircraft performance tools (airframe and engine). Besides the modeling of the ice 
accretion process, aircraft designers also need to know the impact of ice accretions on the 
performance and operation of their aircraft and systems. 
c. Control system design tools. If adequately modeled, the impact of ice accretions on the control 
systems of an aircraft would also allow aircraft manufacturers to design flight control systems 
that can appropriately adapt to control surfaces that are degraded due to ice contamination. 
d. Validation databases. A robust experimental effort is required to provide the knowledge to 
appropriately model the ice accretion, performance, and control of aircraft in atmospheric icing 
conditions. These experimental capabilities are needed to range from very fine scale examinations 
of specific physical processes up to multicomponent interactions required to model full aircraft 
geometries. Besides their use for knowledge development, they are also required for validation of 
completed tools. These databases can also be used on their own to develop empirical rules and 
tools that are often extremely valuable to designers. 
NASA Icing Detection Research Elements 
1. Detection of icing conditions. A significant part of the NASA Aircraft Icing research effort is in the 
understanding, development, and use of advanced instrumentation required to characterize flight and 
ground simulation icing environments. This NASA capability is most often utilized by industry in the 
certification testing of aircraft icing protection systems and has been suggested for use as part of fleet 
operations. Besides in-house activities, NASA has supported commercial development of several 
icing environment instrumentation systems through the NASA’s Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) Program. 
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2. Detection of ice accretions. NASA has traditionally supported the development of ice accretion 
detectors through the SBIR Program. The new engine icing research activity contains in-house efforts 
for developing miniature ice detectors that can be used within the harsh, high-g environment of 
rotating turbomachinery. 
3. Detection of air data system blockage. Very recently, NASA initiated an SBIR research activity 
with a commercial firm to develop technologies that would allow the inflight detection of imminent 
air-data system failure caused by ice blockage. 
NASA Icing Recovery Research Elements 
1. Automated recovery from LOC with contaminated surfaces. As part of the Aviation Safety 
Program, Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control Project, NASA has been developing the fundamental 
knowledge and technologies required to automatically adapt flight controls to account for the effects 
of ice contamination. This adaptive control capability is a key element in the development of systems 
that would allow the automated LOC recovery with ice contaminated surfaces.  
2. Crew controlled recovery from LOC with contaminated surfaces. NASA has also completed 
extensive research and development into crew-controlled recovery of several forms of ice 
contamination LOC, including wing stall and tail stall. As part of this effort, NASA GRC has 
developed a portable flight simulator with control force feedback to accurately demonstrate icing 
effects on flight dynamics to pilots and engineers.  
Summary 
As part of the 2009 to 2010 LOC Study effort, aircraft icing was identified as a significant LOC 
trigger that has been associated with a large percentage of LOC accidents in Part 121, 135, and 
91 operations. The environmental hazard of Icing actually consists of several causal factors. These 
include:  
 
1. Inflight ice accretion induced loss of performance that leads to stall and LOC 
2. Ground ice contamination that prevents aircraft from reaching sufficient flight speed 
3. Ice accretions that cause flight control difficulties due to degraded aerodynamics over control 
surfaces 
4. Engine ingestion of shed ice, ingestion of high levels of ice crystals, or carburetor icing that 
causes airspeed loss or asymmetric thrust 
5. Inflight or ground ice contamination blockage of airdata system pressure ports 
 
Aircraft icing LOC hazards can be mitigated through avoidance, detection, or recovery. The 
mitigations can be broken down into the following categories: 
 
1. Avoidance of icing conditions with the use of improved weather information 
2. Avoidance of icing conditions with enhanced training 
3. Avoidance of icing induced performance and controllability degradations by making aircraft 
more icing tolerant 
4. Detection of ice build-up with sensor systems 
5. Detection of abnormal flight conditions 
6. Recovery from icing induced upsets 
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NASA currently has a significant research effort that supports the development of these LOC 
mitigations. They include: 
 
Icing Avoidance Research Elements 
1. Improving icing weather information 
a. Weather product development 
b. Remote sensor system development 
2. Improving training products and methods 
3. Making aircraft more icing tolerant 
a. Ice accretion simulation tool development 
b. Iced aircraft performance tool development 
c. Control system design tool development 
d. Validation database development 
Icing Detection Research Elements 
1. Development of icing condition measurement technology 
2. Development of ice accretion detection technology 
3. Development of air data blockage detection technology 
Icing Recovery Research Elements 
1. Development of automated icing induced LOC recovery technologies 
2. Development of crewed icing induced LOC recovery technologies 
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